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THE RELEVANCE OF RELEVANCE:  SECTION 215 
OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND THE NSA 
METADATA COLLECTION PROGRAM 
Casey J. McGowan* 
 
In June 2013, a National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, Edward 
Snowden, leaked classified documents exposing a number of secret 
government programs.  Among these programs was the “telephony 
metadata” collection program under which the government collects records 
from phone companies containing call record data for nearly every 
American.  News of this program created considerable controversy and led 
to a wave of litigation contesting the validity of the program. 
The legality of the metadata collection program has been challenged on 
both constitutional and statutory grounds.  The program derives its 
authority from Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, codified as 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1861.  The statute requires that there be reasonable grounds to believe 
the data collected is “relevant to an authorized investigation.”  The 
government deems all these records “relevant” based on the fact that they 
are used to find patterns and connections in preventing terrorist activity.  
Critics of the program, however, assert that billions of records cannot 
possibly be relevant when a negligible portion of those records are actually 
linked to terrorist activity.  This Note examines the conflicting 
interpretations of “relevant,” and concludes that while the current state of 
the law permits bulk data collection, the power of the NSA to collect 
records on such a large scale must be reined in. 
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In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a National Security Agency (NSA) 
contractor, leaked information to the press concerning several secret 
government programs.1  Snowden’s files revealed that the U.S. government 
had ordered Verizon to release phone record data for millions of 
customers.2  This order was part of a larger “telephony metadata”3 
 
 1. Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013 WL 6571596, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 
2013). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Metadata refers to the business records information acquired through programs such 
as the NSA surveillance programs that Snowden’s leaked documents refer to.  Metadata 
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collection program4 for all domestic phone calls on the network.5  Snowden 
has since been charged with espionage and theft of government property.6  
He currently resides in Russia, where he was granted temporary political 
asylum, although he could seek permanent asylum in another country.7  
Snowden’s status has caused significant tension between the United States 
and Russia, and he has become an extremely divisive figure.8  Some view 
him as a champion of individual rights, while others believe his actions 
were unjustified and have labeled him a traitor.9 
The leaks have put the U.S. government in the tenuous position of facing 
both public and legal scrutiny for this and similar programs.  The 
government has acknowledged the existence of the programs and confirmed 
the validity of the leaked information.10  The metadata collection program 
is authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which was enacted as 
section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act).11  The metadata 
collection program began in 2006, and as of October 2013, has been 
renewed thirty-five times.12  In response to the public and media outcry, the 
White House issued an administration white paper outlining the legal basis 
 
includes time, date, and routing information of telephone calls. Joseph T. Thai, Is Data 
Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Steven’s Fourth Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1731, 1734 n.18 (2006). 
 4. The program has been referred to by a number of names including the “bulk data 
collection program,” the “bulk telephony metadata collection program,” the “telephony 
records program,” and the “metadata records program.”  This Note refers to it as the 
metadata collection program. 
 5. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition, or a Writ of Certiorari at 3, In re 
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013) (No. 13-58), 2013 WL 3484365, at *3 
[hereinafter EPIC Petition].  The order required Verizon to produce call detail records “(i) 
between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local 
telephone calls.” In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. ex rel. MCI Commc’n Servs., Inc., No. BR 
13-80, slip op. at 1–2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://epic.org/privacy/nsa/
Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf [hereinafter FISC Order]. 
 6. Pete Williams & Becky Bratu, US Charges NSA Leaker Snowden with Espionage, 
NBC NEWS (June 21, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/21/
19079389-us-charges-nsa-leaker-snowden-with-espionage?lite. 
 7. Steven Lee Myers & Andrew E. Kramer, Defiant Russia Grants Snowden Year’s 
Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2013, at A1. 
 8. Stephen Moore, Note, Cyber Attacks and the Beginnings of an International Cyber 
Treaty, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 223, 252 (2013). 
 9. See Alexander E. Blanchard, A False Choice:  Prior Restraint and Subsequent 
Punishment in a Wikileaks World, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 45 (2013). 
 10. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 724 (2013) (13 Civ. 3994(WHP)), 2013 WL 2492595. 
 11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER 
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 1 (2013), available at 
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Section215.pdf. 
 12. Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013 WL 6571596, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 
2013). 
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for the program,13 which has been rebuked by both privacy interest groups 
and scholars.14 
In addition to public scrutiny, the government faces legal action from a 
number of groups.  One of the predominant pending cases involves the 
ACLU suing a group of high-ranking government officials involved in 
matters of national security.15  Private individuals brought a similar suit in 
the D.C. District Court.16  Additionally, the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (EPIC) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to 
vacate the Verizon order.17  One main contention, voiced by the public at 
large, as well as scholars and privacy interest groups, is that common sense 
dictates that collecting billions of records precludes the possibility that all—
or even most—of those records are “relevant” to an investigation, as 
required by section 215.18  This Note addresses the various arguments 
concerning relevance and determines whether the metadata program 
comports with the language of its statutory authorization. 
The records collection program is extremely expansive, as evidenced by 
the leaked documentation supporting the allegations, impacting millions of 
Americans whose records are being tracked.  Given the far-reaching effects 
of the metadata collection program, the current litigation is more pertinent 
to everyday privacy rights and civil liberties than similar attempts in the 
past.  The direction that the courts deciding this issue take in the current 
litigation will likely impact Fourth Amendment rights and basic privacy 
rights in the United States for years to come. 
Part I of this Note provides background information about the origins of 
the metadata collection program and its purported legal basis.  This includes 
the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and prior judicial 
interpretations of these amendments, as well as the enactment of the Patriot 
Act and its later amendments.  Part II explains the conflict between the 
federal government and various privacy interest groups in determining how 
the term “relevant” should be understood and whether the program is legal.  
 
 13. See id. 
 14. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Problem with the Administration “White Paper” on the 
Telephony Metadata Program, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 12, 2013, 2:34 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/12/problem-withthe-administration-white-paper-on-the-
telephony-metadata-program/.  In addition to the academic debate surrounding the program, 
it has become a highly litigated issue with a number of interested parties submitting amicus 
briefs opposing metadata collection. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in 
Support of Petitioner, In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013) (No. 13-58), 
available at http://epic.org/privacy/nsa/in-re-epic/Cato-Amicus.pdf [hereinafter Cato Brief]; 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professors of Information Privacy and Surveillance Law in Support 
of Petitioner, In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (No. 13-58), available at 
http://www.law.indiana.edu/front/etc/section-215-amicus-8.pdf [hereinafter Privacy 
Professors’ Brief]; see also infra Parts I.E, II.B. 
 15. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10. 
 16. See infra Part I.E.2. 
 17. Timothy B. Lee, Could the Supreme Court Stop the NSA?, WASH. POST (July 9, 
2013, 9:15 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/09/nsa-
litigation-could-go-straight-to-the-supreme-court/. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
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Finally, Part III argues that while the current state of the law weighs in 
favor of the metadata collection program, the court should rein in the 
NSA’s power to collect private information without probable cause in light 
of technological developments and privacy concerns. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, WARRANTLESS SEARCHES, AND STATUTORY 
AUTHORIZATIONS:  HOW MASS DATA COLLECTION BECAME AN 
INVESTIGATIVE NORM 
Part I discusses the evolution of Fourth Amendment protections in regard 
to technological advances, as well as the history of section 215 of the 
Patriot Act.19  Part I.A explores constitutional issues surrounding the 
metadata collection program.  Part I.B discusses the statutory authorization 
for the program—section 215 of the Patriot Act—and the history of that 
Act.  Part I.C surveys the metadata collection program, including how the 
NSA claims to use the information and what procedural safeguards exist.  
Part I.D introduces past cases challenging similar NSA surveillance 
programs and their relation to the current telephony data collection 
program.  Part I.E provides the framework for the current litigation, and 
Part I.F addresses the issue of standing in those cases. 
A.  The Constitutional Framework for Mass Data Collection 
The metadata collection program implicates both First and Fourth 
Amendment concerns.  Although this type of surveillance has not been 
squarely addressed by the Supreme Court, past search and seizure 
jurisprudence is especially relevant to understanding the legality of the 
program and is discussed in Part I.A.1.  Part I.A.2 briefly sets forth the 
relevant First Amendment issues. 
1.  Defining a “Search”:  Constitutional Limits on Warrants and the  
Scope of the Fourth Amendment 
The metadata collection program involves the collection of data without a 
warrant, raising significant Fourth Amendment concerns.  The Fourth 
Amendment states, in relevant part, that people have the right “to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”20  In drafting the Amendment, the Constitution’s Framers 
sought to have the boundaries of a search narrowly defined before it 
occurs.21  The use of warrants as a check on the system helps eliminate the 
potential for abuse of the power to search, even when the investigating 
officer has good intentions.22 
 
 19. The Patriot Act is the common name for the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 21. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 17 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 532 (2006). 
 22. Id. 
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The Fourth Amendment has been understood to mean that searches for 
evidence of a crime, and seizures of such evidence, are presumptively 
unreasonable when no warrant is obtained, unless the search falls into one 
of the few recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.23  What is 
considered a “search” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment has been a 
source of debate and controversy, leading to the Supreme Court’s repeated 
consideration of the issue.  Katz v. United States24 set forth the test for 
when government activity amounts to a search.  The Court applied that 
standard in Smith v. Maryland25 and determined that the Fourth 
Amendment no longer protects information provided to a third party.  More 
recently, in United States v. Jones,26 Justices Sotomayor and Alito 
recognized, in concurring opinions, that it may be time to reevaluate the 
third-party doctrine laid out in Smith. 
a.  Katz and the Reasonable Expectation Test 
In Katz v. United States, the Court held that a “search” can occur even 
without physical intrusion into a “constitutionally protected area.”27  In 
Katz, FBI agents wiretapped a public phone booth where a suspected 
gambler, Charles Katz, had conversations about his wagers.28  Katz argued 
that his privacy was violated by such a “search” in contravention of the 
Fourth Amendment.29  The Court agreed, holding that Katz had an 
expectation of privacy in his telephone conversations and that the 
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person 
claiming its protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been 
invaded by the government.30  In his concurrence, Justice Harlan delineated 
a two-question inquiry for determining whether a search has occurred:  
(1) whether the individual “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy”31 and (2) whether the subjective expectation of privacy is “one that 
 
 23. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  
INVESTIGATIVE 32 (9th ed. 2010).  Courts have recognized a number of exceptions to the 
warrant requirement over time.  Searches pursuant to one of these categories are exempt 
from the warrant requirement and evidence found during that search is admissible.  For 
example, the Court has recognized an exigent circumstances exception, which permits 
officers to conduct a search without a warrant where immediate action is necessary to 
prevent the loss of evidence or to protect the safety of the public or police officers. Id. at 
361.  Additionally, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Court stated that officers who have a 
right to be in a particular place may seize evidence in plain view if they have probable cause 
to believe it is subject to seizure. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 
(1971).  This is by no means an exhaustive discussion, as there are a number of other 
recognized exceptions by which a search may be found lawful, even without a valid warrant. 
 24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 25. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 26. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. 
 28. Id. at 348. 
 29. Id. at 349. 
 30. See id. at 353, 359. 
 31. Id. at 361. 
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society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”32  This analysis was then 
applied in subsequent cases involving privacy rights in technology.33 
The Court noted that, historically, searches only occurred upon physical 
penetration,34 and that without an actual trespass, the Fourth Amendment 
was not violated.35  However, Katz and subsequent cases moved away from 
this interpretation and took a more expansive view of what constitutes a 
search.36 
b.  Eroding Fourth Amendment Protections:   
Applications of the Katz Principle 
Since Katz, the reasonable expectation test has been applied to modern 
investigative techniques.  In recent cases, courts have frequently held that 
an individual lacked an expectation of privacy, and thus the investigation 
was not a “search” subject to Fourth Amendment protections.37 
i.  Smith v. Maryland:  The Third-Party Doctrine 
In Smith v. Maryland, the Court addressed the issue of whether a pen 
register38 is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thus 
requiring a warrant.39  Petitioner Michael Lee Smith was convicted of 
robbing Patricia McDonough’s home and making threatening phone calls to 
the residence afterwards.40  Smith was suspected as the robber after police 
traced the license plate number of a suspicious vehicle seen outside the 
home back to him.41  The day after obtaining the registration information, 
police directed Smith’s telephone company to install a pen register on his 
number without obtaining a warrant.42  The register revealed that Smith’s 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. See infra note 37; see also infra Part I.A.1.b. 
 34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 35. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (stating that without a 
physical invasion into a defendant’s house or “curtilage,” there is no search or seizure within 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment); see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 
134–36 (1942) (holding that because the trespass did not materially aid in the collection of 
evidence, the Fourth Amendment was not violated). 
 36. For a full discussion of the Katz principle, cases encouraging a more flexible 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and the application of Katz to evolving 
technologies, see Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones:  Does Katz Still 
Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116, 125–39 (2012). 
 37. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (stating that despite an 
individual’s attempts to restrict some views of his activities (i.e., from ground level), there is 
no expectation of privacy against aerial surveillance from 1,000 feet because it is public 
airspace); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (affirming that individuals do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields); United States v. White, 890 F.2d 
1012 (8th Cir. 1989)  (finding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public 
restroom stall). 
 38. A pen register is a device that records the numbers called by the telephone to which 
it is attached. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 23, at 50. 
 39. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737–38 (1979). 
 40. Id. at 737. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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number had called the McDonough residence, which the police then used to 
obtain a search warrant for his home.43  During the search, a phonebook 
was found open to the page listing the McDonough’s number, and Mrs. 
McDonough later identified Smith in a six-man lineup.44  Smith sought to 
suppress all evidence derived from the pen register since the police had 
failed to obtain a warrant prior to its installation.45 
Applying Katz, the Court acknowledged that a search can occur even 
without a physical invasion into a “constitutionally protected area.”46  
Citing Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, the Court divided the issue into 
two discrete questions:  (1) whether the individual had a subjective 
expectation of privacy and (2) whether that expectation is one that society 
views as reasonable.47  Smith had no claim that his property was invaded, 
because the register was installed at the telephone company’s office.  He 
argued instead that despite the lack of a trespass, his expectation of privacy 
was infringed upon.48  The Court, however, distinguished the 
communications in Katz from those in Smith based on the fact that a pen 
register does not collect the contents of the call itself, only information 
about the call.49 
The Court stated, first, that people cannot have an expectation of privacy 
in this type of data since they must realize this information is conveyed to 
telephone companies and retained for billing purposes, among other 
reasons.50  The Court further noted that even if Smith had a subjective 
expectation of privacy, it was not objectively reasonable, as “the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that . . . the confidence placed in 
the third party will not be betrayed.”51  Because Smith voluntarily conveyed 
the information to a third party, he assumed the risk that the company 
would reveal the information to police,52 and therefore the search did not 
require a warrant.53  This approach, known as the third-party doctrine, holds 
that information conveyed to a third party is susceptible to exposure to law 
enforcement without the speaker’s consent.54 
Justice Stewart, in dissent, argued that numbers dialed from a private 
phone fall under the same constitutional protection as private conversations, 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 739. 
 47. Id. at 740. 
 48. Id. at 741. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 742–43. 
 51. Id. at 744 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 745–46. 
 54. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 
563 (2009). 
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and that Smith had a reasonable expectation of privacy.55  In a separate 
dissent, Justice Marshall argued that implicit in the notion of assumption of 
risk is a sense of choice, and that in older consensual surveillance cases, the 
defendant had some discretion in determining who could access his 
communications.56  Justice Marshall argued that with the advent of 
technology and its role in everyday life, the majority promoted the rule that 
“unless a person is willing to forgo use of what for many has become a 
personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of 
surveillance.”57 
ii.  United States v. Jones:  Modernizing the Fourth Amendment 
In a more recent test of Fourth Amendment limits, the Court applied the 
Katz test in United States v. Jones.58  There, the Court addressed the issue 
of whether attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle and using it to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.59  Law enforcement applied for a warrant authorizing the use 
of a GPS tracking device on the car of a suspected drug trafficker’s wife.60  
The warrant was issued with the requirement that the device be installed 
within ten days.61  Agents waited until the eleventh day to install the GPS 
device and then proceeded to track the car’s movements over the course of 
the next twenty-eight days.62  The drug trafficker moved to suppress the 
GPS evidence, but the district court only partially granted the motion, ruling 
that the data obtained while the vehicle was in the private parking garage 
where they first installed the device was inadmissible.63  The trafficker was 
convicted of drug-related offenses, but on appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed, 
holding that the evidence was obtained by warrantless use of the GPS, thus 
violating the Fourth Amendment.64 
The Supreme Court held that a “search” had occurred and that the 
trafficker’s Fourth Amendment rights were therefore violated.65  Justice 
Scalia reasoned that Katz “did not erode the principle ‘that, when the 
Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally 
protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.’”66  The Court stated that Katz did not 
 
 55. Smith, 442 U.S. at 747. 
 56. Id. at 750. 
 57. Id.; see also Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 546 (discussing how, in modern life, it is 
not truly “voluntary” to turn over personal information, as such exposure is inevitable by 
individuals availing themselves of technological conveniences and societal norms). 
 58. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 59. Id. at 948. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  The data tracking his movements on public roadways, however, was admissible 
as there is no expectation of privacy in that information. Id. 
 64. Id. at 949. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 951 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)). 
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narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope, and that the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test was an addition to the common law trespass understanding 
of a search.67 
The Court, in Jones, acknowledged the existence of related issues and 
addressed the difficulty inherent in deciding those issues.  Questions of 
whether the crime involved affects the scope of a search or whether visual 
surveillance through electronic means, without any trespass, constitutes a 
search remain unanswered.68  Justice Sotomayor, in a concurring opinion, 
expressed concern over the fact that technology now makes physical 
intrusion unnecessary in most cases.69  She stated, “More fundamentally, it 
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties,” because in the growing age of digital technology, people are 
routinely required to provide information about themselves in the course of 
carrying out their daily activities.70  She urged that the Fourth Amendment 
protections may only be applied if the Court’s jurisprudence “ceases to treat 
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy,” but acknowledged that those 
questions need not be resolved in Jones because of the physical intrusion 
into his car.71 
Justice Alito stressed that technology can change the expectations of a 
reasonable person: 
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular 
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in 
popular attitudes.  New technology may provide increased convenience or 
security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff 
worthwhile. . . . 
 On the other hand, concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur 
the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions.72 
Although there is no simple solution for what test to use in determining 
whether Fourth Amendment protections apply, the Court has begun to 
acknowledge that there are many unresolved issues in this body of law.  




 67. Id. at 951–52. 
 68. Id. at 953–54. 
 69. Id. at 955; see also Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe:  The Fourth 
Amendment and the Use of Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 
502 (2012). 
 70. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 962. 
 73. Emas & Pallas, supra note 36, at 165, 167. 
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2.  Free Speech and the First Amendment 
The metadata collection program also raises First Amendment concerns.  
The First Amendment protects the right to free speech,74 and critics of the 
program have asserted that it infringes on protected speech.75  This 
particular aspect of the metadata collection program is currently being 
litigated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation in First Unitarian Church of 
Los Angeles v. NSA.76 
B.  Statutory Authorization for the Program:  Patriot Act Section 215 
The business records provision of FISA, enacted as section 215 of the 
Patriot Act, authorizes the metadata collection program.77  Although FISA 
is over thirty years old, its application and powers expanded greatly after 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.78 
1.  History of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
FISA was first enacted in 1978 and governs electronic surveillance for 
foreign intelligence purposes.79  Although the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure also govern searches and electronic surveillance, “the secret and 
less protective rules and procedures of FISA may be employed”80 when 
matters of national security are involved and the aim is to collect foreign 
intelligence.  The underlying rationale holds that threats of terrorism are 
particularly serious, and therefore “privacy intrusions are limited to the 
collection of information for foreign intelligence purposes.”81 
 
 74. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 75. While this Note focuses on the search aspect of the metadata collection program, the 
concerns about First Amendment free speech protections are an important aspect of the 
debate.  For a discussion of First Amendment rights in cyberlaw, see Anupam Chander & 
Uyên Lê, The Free Speech Foundations of Cyberlaw (U.C. Davis Legal Studies, Working 
Paper No. 351, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2320124. 
 76. The First Amendment issues raised by this litigation are beyond the scope of this 
Note.  However, for an overview of this case and the First Amendment concerns raised by 
the metadata collection program, see First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/first-unitarian-church-los-angeles-
v-nsa (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  Critics contend that even though the actual content of the 
calls is not obtained, the NSA is able to piece together enough information that the program 
violates First Amendment protections.  For example, in 2006, then Senator Joe Biden told 
CBS that the content of calls is not necessary to know about that person’s life, and that based 
solely on what calls an individual makes, it is possible to get a pattern of that person’s life 
that is “very, very intrusive.” The Early Show (CBS television broadcast May 12, 2006), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/flashback-biden-agrees-access-
metadata-very-very-intrusive-video. 
 77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 1. 
 78. See infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text. 
 79. William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down:  Secret Surveillance After 
the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2003). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1148–49. 
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FISA imposes less judicial control over the scope of surveillance than 
other statutory regimes and does not always require meeting the high 
standard of probable cause before surveillance can commence.82  FISA has 
been construed to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, and therefore compliance with these procedures and criteria 
has been held as an adequate substitute for a warrant.83  The surveillance 
authorized by FISA, however, is not intended for law enforcement 
purposes, as there is a distinction between foreign intelligence and law 
enforcement.84  There is often a suspicion of criminal activity when 
surveillance of U.S. citizens is involved, but law enforcement was never the 
main purpose of FISA.85 
2.  Establishing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
The FISC was established by 50 U.S.C. § 1803 and consists of eleven 
district court judges from at least seven of the federal circuits, all of whom 
must reside within twenty miles of the District of Columbia.86  FISC judges 
are publicly designated by the chief justice of the United States.87  They 
have the power to “hear applications for and grant orders approving 
electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States,” but may not 
hear an application that was previously denied by another FISC judge.88 
In addition to the FISC, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
Review (FISCR) has been described as “the nation’s most secret appellate 
court.”89  This court meets on extremely rare occasions, convening for the 
first time in its then twenty-four year history in 2002.90  The FISCR 
consists of a three-judge panel and considers appeals from FISC 
decisions.91  These three judges are also designated by the chief justice of 
the United States and must be federal district court or appellate court 
judges.92  This panel may review any denial of an application made to the 
FISC.93  Judges on both the FISC and the FISCR serve a maximum of 
seven years and are not eligible for redesignation once that period has 
expired.94 
 
 82. Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 533. 
 83. Banks, supra note 79, at 1158; see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 573 
(1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987); United States 
v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1984).  The requirements of FISA have been relaxed 
since these decisions, and obtaining foreign intelligence still satisfies the Fourth Amendment 
requirements, even where it is a significant purpose of surveillance, rather than the primary 
purpose. See United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 337, 341–45 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 84. See Banks, supra note 79, at 1160. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Banks, supra note 79, at 1171. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. § 1803(d). 
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3.  FISC Orders and the Requirement of Relevance 
Under FISA, the government can submit applications to the FISC 
requesting that they order the production of certain records.  Recipients of a 
FISC subpoena for records may challenge that order.95  The subpoena may 
be quashed if the challenging party can show that the information sought is 
privileged or is “not relevant to a legitimate inquiry.”96  The challenging 
party must petition the FISC, at which time a FISC judge is assigned to 
review the petition for frivolity.97  If the petition is not frivolous, it is 
considered, and may be granted only if “the judge finds that [the] order does 
not meet the requirements” of 50 U.S.C. § 186198 or that it is “otherwise 
unlawful.”99  The problem with this system, however, is that only the 
recipient of the order—no other individual—has a right of judicial review 
before the FISC.100  The party who receives a subpoena is generally not the 
party whose privacy interests are at stake, thus providing them with little 
incentive to challenge the order.101 
Prior to September 11, FISA was a fairly unknown statute, particularly 
among the general public.102  From 1979 through 2000, the FISC received 
an average of approximately 600 warrant applications per year, but never 
rejected an application.103  From 2001 through 2012, however, that number 
increased drastically, as the FISC received an average of over 1,700 
applications, rejecting only eleven.104  This was due, in large part, to the 
amendment of sections 215 and 505 of the Patriot Act, which reduced the 
threshold requirements for intelligence and records gathering.105 
In 2012, the most recent year for which statistics are available, the 
government made 1,856 applications to the FISC.106  Of those, 1,789 were 
requests to conduct electronic surveillance.107  All of the applications were 
approved by the FISC with the exception of one, which was later withdrawn 
 
 95. Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 545. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 50 U.S.C § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 98. For a full discussion of 50 U.S.C § 1861 and the requirements set forth in the 
business records provision of FISA, see infra Part I.B.4. 
 99. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(B). 
 100. See id. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i). 
 101. Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 545.  Schulhofer suggests that investigators should be 
required to obtain warrants based on probable cause in order to align more closely with the 
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 545–46. 
 102. Id. at 534–35. 
 103. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979–2012, EPIC.ORG, 
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 549.  The reduced requirements and the extension of 
FISA to a broader range of information provides investigators with “quick, relatively 
unsupervised access to highly personal and politically sensitive records.” Id. at 548–50. 
 106. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Attorney General, to Harry Reid, 
Senate Majority Leader 1 (Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/
foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf. 
 107. Id. 
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by the government.108  Two hundred and twelve of those applications were 
for business records under 50 U.S.C. § 1861, all of which were approved in 
their entirety.109 
4.  FISA After 9/11:  50 U.S.C. § 1861, Statutory Authority for the 
Metadata Collection Program 
The metadata collection program derives its legal authority from section 
215 of the Patriot Act,110 which amended parts of FISA.111  The Patriot Act 
was passed within a few weeks of 9/11, after limited debates, in an effort to 
give the White House administration greater authority and power in their 
efforts to counteract terrorism.112  The statute allows the director of the FBI 
or his designee to “make an application for an order requiring the 
production of any tangible things” in order to collect information 
concerning foreign intelligence.113  It also stipulates that any investigation 
concerning U.S. persons must not be conducted solely on the basis of 
activities that are protected under the First Amendment.114  Investigations 
must be conducted in accordance with Executive Order 12,333, which 
provides guidance for U.S. Intelligence Activities.115 
The application must contain a statement of facts showing that there are 
“reasonable grounds” to suspect that the items sought are “relevant to an 
authorized investigation.”116  It goes on to provide three examples of things 
that are presumptively relevant to the investigation: 
[T]hey pertain to—(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 
(ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the 
subject of such authorized investigation; or (iii) an individual in contact 
with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject 
of such authorized investigation . . . .117 
While this is not an exhaustive list of what may be considered relevant, it 
does provide a sense of what the legislature had in mind in enacting the 
statute. 
The statute further provides for the procedures to be followed upon 
judicial approval, and describes what the order must contain.118  It also 
limits whom recipients of an order may disclose information to119 and 
provides that anyone who turns over the tangible things designated by the 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2. 
 110. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 111. Banks, supra note 79, at 1166. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2006). 
 114. Id. § 1861(a)(2)(B). 
 115. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470, 
3 C.F.R. 218, 227 (2008), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 934–43 (Supp. V 
2011). 
 116. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. § 1861(c). 
 119. Id. § 1861(d). 
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order in good faith will not be liable for such production.120  Subsection f 
permits recipients of an order to file for judicial review of that order in 
accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(1).121  It also permits a recipient to 
challenge the nondisclosure order one year after the issuance of the original 
order and outlines the procedures for how such a review is to be 
conducted.122  Finally, the statute requires the attorney general to adopt 
minimization procedures123 to govern the retention of information received 
pursuant to orders authorized by this title.124  Any “tangible things” 
collected must be used in accordance with these minimization 
procedures.125 
Although the title (50 U.S.C. § 1861) is lengthy and involved, there are 
three essential legal elements concerning the metadata collection program:  
(1) the collection is part of an authorized investigation, (2) the records 
obtained are “tangible things,” and (3) the data collected is relevant to that 
investigation.126  This Note addresses whether the metadata collection 
program meets these requirements, focusing on the relevancy standard as 
applied to mass data collection. 
C.  The Telephony Metadata Collection Program 
The metadata collection program is a complicated and secretive 
endeavor, but since the initial Snowden leaks, information has slowly 
become available, resulting in a rapidly developing understanding of the 
program.  Part I.C.1 discusses the purpose of the program.  Part I.C.2 
provides an overview of how the collected data is used, and Part I.C.3 
considers past compliance problems where program guidelines were not 
followed properly. 
1.  Purpose of the Program 
Beginning in 2006, the federal government implemented a metadata 
collection program for the purpose of “combating international terrorism 
and preventing potentially catastrophic terrorist attacks on [the United 
States]” by “identifying terrorist operatives and networks” through the 
examination of terrorist communications.127  The metadata collection 
program is designed to give the NSA the ability to identify terrorist threats 
 
 120. Id. § 1861(e). 
 121. Id. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i); see also supra Part I.B.3. 
 122. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i)–(D). 
 123. Minimization procedures refers to the specific guidelines that minimize the 
retention, and prevent the dissemination, of nonpublic information.  They do, however, allow 
information to be disclosed in specific law enforcement and foreign intelligence scenarios. 
See id. § 1861(g)(2). 
 124. Id. § 1861(g)(1). 
 125. Id. § 1861(h). 
 126. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 6–16.  The white paper also discusses 
the fact that although the orders are prospective in nature, they still comply with § 1861. Id. 
at 16.  This however, has not been a highly contested issue and, therefore, is not relevant to 
this Note. 
 127. Id. at 1–2. 
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within the country.128  The term “metadata” is used to refer to call data that 
does not include the contents of the calls.129  By following connections and 
patterns in phone records, NSA analysts seek to find links in the structure of 
terrorist organizations.130 
2.  How the Data Is Analyzed 
The program involves collecting phone records directly from service 
providers,131 pursuant to orders from the FISC.132  The records include both 
calls made entirely within the United States, as well as those between a U.S. 
number and a number abroad.133  Initially, there was much speculation 
about what “call detail records” referred to,134 but in August 2013, the 
White House acknowledged that the data includes “the numbers dialed, the 
length and time of the calls and other similar dialing, routing, addressing, or 
signaling information.”135 
Once the data is collected, it is stored in secure databases by the NSA.136  
The records are only supposed to be accessed for counterterrorism 
purposes,137 and the data may only be queried upon a finding of reasonable 
articulable suspicion (RAS)138 that the information is associated with one or 
more specified foreign terrorist organizations, the determination of which 
must be made by one of twenty-two authorized persons at the NSA.139  This 
number is known as the “seed” identifier.140  After an analyst is approved to 
conduct the query, the inquiry is limited to records within three “hops” of 
the identifier, meaning that the results of the search show the records for the 
number that is suspected to be in contact with a terrorist organization (first 
hop), the numbers in contact with that first hop (second hop), and the 
numbers in contact with the second hop (third hop).141  This is designed to 
 
 128. Id. at 2. 
 129. Id. at 2. 
 130. Id. at 2–3. 
 131. Verizon, Sprint, and AT&T have all been confirmed as recipients of the FISC orders.  
Verizon has 98.9 million wireless customers and 22.2 million landline customers, Sprint has 
a total of 55 million customers, and AT&T has 107.3 million wireless customers, in addition 
to its 31.2 million landline customers. Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez & Janet Hook, U.S. 
Collects Vast Data Trove, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2013, at A1. 
 132. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 3. 
 133. FISC Order, supra note 5, at 2. 
 134. See EPIC Petition, supra note 5, at 9. 
 135. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 20. 
 136. David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 1 LAWFARE RES. PAPER 
SERIES 10 (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/
Lawfare-Research-Paper-Series-No.-4-2.pdf. 
 137. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 3. 
 138. Reasonable, articulable suspicion is defined as the ability “to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant [the] intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 139. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 3–5. 
 140. Id. at 3. 
 141. Id. at 3–4.  For an example of how this works in practice and an explanation of how 
expansive this system has the potential to be, see Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL), 
2013 WL 6571596, at *7 n.21 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013). 
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give analysts the flexibility to find patterns of communication and 
connections among numbers.142 
Any data that has not been reviewed is retained for five years and then 
automatically purged.143  Additionally, any data that is found to have been 
improperly collected is also purged.144 
3.  Past Compliance Problems 
Although there are standards and procedures in place, numerous 
problems have arisen regarding the use of the collected data.  In a March 
2009 order, FISC Judge Walton expressed concern over a number of past 
indiscretions involving NSA use of metadata.145  For example, an alert list 
was set up to help prioritize the review of metadata, with all matches 
subject to the RAS standard before review.146  However, most of the 
metadata that was queried was not RAS approved.  In fact, the government 
reported that as of January 15, 2009, only 1,935 of the 17,835 identifiers on 
the alert list were granted RAS status by an authorized NSA official.147 
Additionally, misrepresentations were made to the FISC concerning the 
alert-list process and the metadata collection program.148  The NSA 
reported that this was due, in part, to the fact that “from a technical 
standpoint, there was no single person who had a complete technical 
understanding of [the collection program].”149 
D.  Past NSA Surveillance and Jewel v. NSA 
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the NSA has been scrutinized 
for a number of surveillance programs.150  Notably, in the aftermath of 
9/11, President Bush expanded a surveillance program to include domestic 
communications with suspected terrorists, where previously, NSA 
warrantless surveillance was limited to parties outside the United States.151  
As early as 2006, reports indicated that mass data collection from American 
telephone companies was occurring, but that surveillance occurred without 
approval from the FISC.152 
The history of NSA surveillance is extensive and ultimately beyond the 
scope of this Note, yet one ongoing case is particularly relevant in the 
 
 142. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 4. 
 143. Kris, supra note 136, at 15. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See generally In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, 2009 
WL 9150913 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009). 
 146. Id. at *2. 
 147. Id. at *2 n.2. 
 148. Id. at *3–4.  For example, Judge Walton points to repeated misrepresentations about 
the alert list process. Id. 
 149. Id. at *4. 
 150. See How the NSA’s Domestic Spying Program Works, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/how-it-works (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 151. Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability:  A Case Study of the 
Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. REV. 357, 391. 
 152. See id. at 391–92. 
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current context.  In Jewel v. NSA, the Electronic Frontier Foundation sued 
the government agencies involved in dragnet surveillance.153  Originally 
filed in 2008, the suit is ongoing, but essentially seeks to prevent the same 
type of dragnet surveillance that has been at issue since the Snowden 
disclosures.154  The complaint alleges that the government was operating a 
dragnet surveillance program by soliciting AT&T for the disclosure of all 
information in their telephone and internet records databases.155 
In 2009, the Obama Administration moved to dismiss, asserting that it 
would require the government to divulge “state secrets.”156  The suit was 
instead dismissed on standing grounds, but was renewed in 2011 when the 
Ninth Circuit found the allegations were sufficient and the suit could 
continue in the district court.157  The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs 
alleged a concrete and particularized injury, the challenged action was fairly 
traceable to the harm suffered, and the issue was redressable.158  Because 
there was standing, the suit was remanded to the district court to consider 
defenses, particularly whether the state secrets privilege prevented this 
action.159 
In 2013, the Northern District of California found that the state secrets 
privilege was preempted by the procedural mechanisms of FISA under 
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f).160  The plaintiffs brought their claims under a number 
of FISA provisions, but notably not under 50 U.S.C. § 1861.161  The court 
dismissed some of the statutory claims alleged by the plaintiffs, and noted 
that although there was standing, “the potential risk to national security may 
still be too great to pursue confirmation of the existence or facts relating to 
the scope of the alleged governmental Program.”162 
E.  Current Litigation 
This Note attempts to examine the relevancy standard and its application 
to the metadata collection program.  That issue has been one of the main 
points of contention in a number of current lawsuits, and courts are now 
faced with the task of determining just how broad “relevant” is in relation to 
authorized national security surveillance programs.  The Supreme Court 
declined to hear this issue, but in two lower court decisions, the judges 
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deciding the case took very different views of the metadata collection 
program’s legality.  Klayman v. Obama163 and ACLU v. Clapper164 
represent the first time a non-FISC judge has weighed in on the merits of 
the program.165  Judge Leon, of the D.C. district court, reached the 
conclusion that the metadata collection program is not legal, while Judge 
Pauley, of the Southern District of New York, came to the opposite 
conclusion.  In Part II, the arguments made in these three suits are examined 
collectively, as the points made are very similar and will inform the 
decisions on appeal. 
1.  In re Electronic Privacy Information Center 
In In re Electronic Privacy Information Center,166 EPIC petitioned the 
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, or, alternatively, a writ of certiorari 
to review the FISC’s decision.167  EPIC broadly argued that the metadata 
collection program does not comply with its statutory authority and, by 
granting the orders, the FISC exceeded its lawful jurisdiction.168  EPIC 
further argued that because of the structure of the FISC, the Supreme Court 
is the only court that can grant relief,169 and as a Verizon customer for the 
entire duration of the program,170 EPIC has suffered an injury and is 
entitled to the writ.  To grant a writ, the court must find that three 
requirements are met:  (1) the party seeking the writ has no other adequate 
means of relief, (2) they have shown that the right to the writ is clear and 
indisputable, and (3) the issuing court believes the writ is appropriate given 
the circumstances.171  On November 18, 2013, the Court denied the writ 
without explanation.172 
2.  Klayman v. Obama 
In the first of two district court cases considering the issue, private 
individuals brought suit against a number of executive branch officials.  
This case was the first time a non-FISC federal judge addressed the legality 
of the metadata collection program.173 
On December 16, 2013, Judge Leon granted a preliminary injunction 
preventing the federal government from collecting the records of two 
individuals, Larry Klayman and Charles Strange, and ordered the 
 
 163. No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013). 
 164. No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP), 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013). 
 165. See infra Part I.E.2–3. 
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destruction of any existing records pertaining to these individuals.174  Larry 
Klayman has become well known for his litigation against the government 
over the past two decades and declared this the “biggest ruling in the history 
of government litigation.”175  Judge Leon accepted the plaintiffs’ position 
that this type of data collection is not controlled by Smith v. Maryland.176  
He did, however, grant a stay of the order pending appeal due to the 
“significant national security interests at stake.”177  Judge Leon also 
cautioned that, should his ruling be upheld, the government should be 
prepared to immediately comply with the order, as the appeal process 
would likely take six months.178 
3.  ACLU v. Clapper 
Finally, the ACLU filed suit in the Southern District of New York, 
naming James Clapper, Keith Alexander, Charles Hagel, Eric Holder, and 
James Comey as defendants.179  The complaint alleges that the program 
exceeds it statutory authority and violates the First and Fourth 
Amendments.180  The plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction discontinuing 
the use of FISC orders for metadata collection, as well as an order requiring 
the NSA to purge all of the data they have about the plaintiffs.181 
On December 27, 2013, Judge Pauley granted the government’s motion 
to dismiss, finding the metadata collection program legal.182  Like Judge 
Leon, Judge Pauley dismissed the plaintiff’s statutory claims, but, 
nonetheless, discussed the merits of the claims and reached the conclusion 
that they would ultimately fail.183  Judge Pauley emphasized that all of the 
data is relevant because the government cannot otherwise make use of the 
information to find connections.184  He ultimately based his dismissal on 
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constitutional grounds, holding that the metadata collection program does 
not violate either the Fourth or First Amendment.185 
F.  Standing and Jurisdiction 
One concern with the issues surrounding the metadata collection program 
is whether courts will be willing to decide the merits of the case.  
Comparisons between the current issue and past cases involving NSA 
surveillance programs, like Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,186 are 
inapposite.  In Clapper, Amnesty International challenged the 
constitutionality of section 702 of FISA,187 but the claim failed for lack of 
standing since Amnesty International could not establish an injury in 
fact.188  There was no evidence that Amnesty International was a target of 
surveillance under the statute, and any speculation about a future injury 
failed to sustain the Article III standing requirement.189 
Under the present surveillance program, however, evidence of an injury 
in fact exists, as there is documentation that Verizon, among other 
providers, turned over phone records for the vast majority of their 
customers.190  Those customers can arguably assert an invasion of privacy 
and a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, in addition to statutory 
claims, which is exactly what some parties have done in the current 
litigation.191 
Regarding In re Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Supreme 
Court denied the petition for certiorari but did not state why.192  The Court 
arguably could have exercised jurisdiction over the case, but ultimately 
chose not to.  Marbury v. Madison193 established that Congress lacks the 
ability to expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.194  However, 
when a particular suit is filed in the Supreme Court, the Constitution’s 
original jurisdiction only applies where the petitioner does not seek to 
overturn a lower court decision.195  Essentially, Marbury is not a bar to an 
original action that “attack[s] a lower-court decision that is not itself 
directly appealable.”196  Justice Souter described such suits as “commonly 
understood to be ‘original’ in the sense of being filed in the first instance in 
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this Court, but nonetheless for constitutional purposes an exercise of [the] 
Court’s appellate (rather than original) jurisdiction.”197 
Furthermore, there may have been statutory jurisdiction for the Court to 
hear the petition.  EPIC asserts that the Court has jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the All Writs Act) and 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803 and 1861(f).198  
50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(b) and 1861(f)(3) give the Supreme Court the authority 
to review decisions by the FISC, as appealed to the FISCR.199  The All 
Writs Act allows appellate courts to exercise appellate review beyond what 
is provided for by statute as long as the review is “‘in aid of’ the appellate 
court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the lower court.”200  Since the Court 
conceivably could have reviewed the metadata orders, the prerequisites of 
the All Writs Act are satisfied.201 
Another interpretation of § 1803 is that the Supreme Court can only hear 
the petition if the FISCR denies a government application.202  That, 
however, cannot happen here because the FISCR has not denied any 
government application.203  A similar issue occurred in 2003 when the 
ACLU petitioned for a writ of certiorari regarding a Department of Justice 
surveillance program.204  The ACLU acknowledged that FISA only allows 
for Supreme Court review following petition by the government, but 
interpreted Congressional silence on the issue of approved applications to 
mean that the Court could correct the FISCR’s mistakes.205  The ACLU 
further asserted that the All Writs Act is designed for situations such as the 
one they faced in 2003 and the current issue.206 
Overall it appears that, at least in their ability to bring these suits, the 
parties involved have the right to challenge the metadata collection 
program.207  In the case of EPIC’s petition, the Supreme Court was always 
likely to dismiss the petition since an extraordinary writ “is not a matter of 
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right,” is issued sparingly, and is entirely up to the Court’s discretion.208  It 
was thought that a dismissal would probably hinge on the merits rather than 
on jurisdictional grounds, as the Court is likely to allow lower courts to 
address the issue first when those suits have already been filed, as is the 
case here.  The Court’s reasoning behind the denial, however, remains to be 
determined.209 
II.  DEBATING THE MERITS:  IS THE METADATA COLLECTION PROGRAM 
LEGAL?  CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND INTERPRETING  
THE MEANING OF “RELEVANCE” 
Central to the current litigation is the issue of what relevance means 
within the context of section 215.  This Part discusses the arguments in each 
current suit collectively, rather than separately.  Part II.A provides an 
overview of where the statutory authorization for the metadata collection 
program fits within the framework of the Fourth Amendment.  Part II.B 
focuses on defining the word “relevant” within section 215 and debates the 
breadth of the term in regards to the metadata collection program.  Part II.C 
briefly addresses the Fourth Amendment arguments on each side and 
discusses whether Smith controls. 
A.  Overview of the Applicable Legal Framework 
If the metadata collection program is found to comply with all of the 
statutory requirements, it would constitute a presumptively reasonable 
search.210  That, however, would not completely insulate the program from 
legal scrutiny, as it could still be found unconstitutional under either the 
First or Fourth Amendment.211  It is important to understand the issue of 
relevancy within the context of the Fourth Amendment framework and the 
warrant requirements implemented by the courts because, although the 
searches conducted by the NSA are warrantless, they still have to meet the 
standards set forth in section 215 to be considered valid.  The requirements 
for a valid search and the requirements set forth by section 215 are strongly 
intertwined, and neither can be understood without considering the other.  
Should the courts find that the program complies with the statute, the 
presumption of a valid search is rebuttable and the program could still be 
invalidated on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
This Note seeks to determine whether the metadata collection program is 
legal as it is currently utilized.  There are a number of debated points 
pertinent to that overall conflict, but this Note will focus on two main issues 
that have taken priority in the current litigation:  (1) whether the data 
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collected can be considered “relevant” (as that is the central issue in 
assessing the validity of the metadata collection program under section 
215), and (2) whether Smith v. Maryland governs a Fourth Amendment 
analysis of the metadata collection program.  The constitutional concerns, 
however, are of lesser importance to this Note, as many scholars believe 
that, under current precedent, the program stands on solid constitutional 
footing.212 
B.  Is the Data “Relevant”? 
The initial question in determining whether the metadata collection 
program complies with 50 U.S.C. § 1861 is whether there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the data is relevant to the investigation.213  
Understanding the meaning of the term “relevant” within section 215 has 
proven challenging, and a number of arguments have been advanced in an 
attempt to define the term in the manner most advantageous to each side.  
The government argues that “relevant” is to be applied broadly—making 
the records collection process legal.214  On the other hand, privacy 
advocates feel that it must be defined narrowly, and that by collecting 
billions of records, the NSA cannot reasonably be simply collecting only 
“relevant” records.215  Ultimately, the question turns on whether 
investigations into specific terrorist groups can create reasonable grounds to 
believe that metadata of virtually the entire U.S. population is “relevant.”216 
As of the writing of this Note, no non-FISC judge has decided whether 
the metadata collection program is legal under section 215.  In both 
Klayman v. Obama and ACLU v. Clapper, the only non-FISC cases to 
decide the issue to date, the judges declined to base their decisions on 
statutory grounds, stating that Congress did not intend to permit judicial 
review under an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim.217  Instead, 
their decisions centered on the constitutional questions raised.218  Defining 
relevance in the context of FISA, however, will likely be an essential part of 
these cases on appeal.219 
The remainder of this Part addresses the various arguments and support 
on each side of the debate.  Part II.B.1 looks to FISC opinions, while Part 
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II.B.2 turns to the text of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 itself.  Part II.B.3 compares the 
statute to other sources of law that define “relevance,” and Part II.B.4 
considers the legislative history of the statute. 
1.  Differing FISC Interpretations 
The FISC continually grants orders for the metadata collection program.  
The FISC first authorized the metadata collection program in 2006, and 
since that authorization, the program has been renewed thirty-five times 
(generally in three-month periods) by fifteen different judges.220  FISC 
judges have, however, expressed mixed feelings about the program.  While 
all have ultimately approved it, some are much more supportive of the 
program than others.  Two of the FISC orders that have been made public 
are representative of the conflicting views on the program.  Judge Eagan 
strongly supports the program, while Judge Walton had some reservations 
in his approval.  These opinions are discussed in turn in Parts II.B.1.a and 
II.B.1.b. 
a.  Judge Eagan:  The Metadata Collection Program Is Legal 
In her August 2013 opinion regarding the issuance of an order in July 
2013, Judge Eagan concluded that the standard for relevance is met by the 
metadata collection program because “international terrorist operatives are 
using telephone communications,” and the bulk records help “to determine 
those connections between known and unknown international terrorist 
operatives.”221  Judge Eagan notes that the records do not actually need to 
be relevant, but that the government must show that there are “reasonable 
grounds to believe” that the records sought are relevant.222  Because 
Congress left the term undefined, Judge Eagan adheres to a broad reading 
that “amounts to a relatively low standard.”223 
Judge Eagan adopted the reasoning of a 2010 FISC opinion that noted 
that a finding of relevance rests on whether the bulk collection is necessary 
for the NSA to utilize tools to generate investigative leads.224  She stated 
that the government had done just that by “posit[ing] that bulk telephonic 
metadata is necessary to its investigations because it is impossible to know 
where in the data the connections to international terrorist organizations 
will be found.”225  The NSA uses the historical data once a specific terrorist 
identifier is found, and maintaining the bulk data allows them to keep that 
information until it is needed.226  Without the totality of the data, the 
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information gathering process is stunted, thereby rendering the records 
“relevant.” 
b.  Judge Walton Upbraids the NSA in 2009 for Failure To Conduct the 
Program in an Appropriate Manner 
Judge Walton also signed the order and ultimately approved of the 
metadata collection program, but remained skeptical about it.  His decision 
was based largely on the fact that the program had been consistently 
reauthorized, but he expressed concern about the privacy of U.S. citizens 
and the fact that “the FISC’s authorizations of this vast collection program 
have been premised on a flawed depiction of how the NSA uses [telephony] 
metadata.”227  He pointed out a number of oversight problems with the 
program,228 and went on to discuss his doubts about the structure and use of 
the metadata collection.229  Judge Walton pointed out that “nearly all” of 
the call records obtained did not concern people who were targets of an FBI 
investigation, and that ordinarily, the data could not legally be obtained in 
bulk (i.e., would not be deemed relevant to the investigation).230  He 
concluded that this alone would usually be enough for the FISC to deny the 
application for an order to a phone company.231 
Despite this lack of relevance, Judge Walton granted the order based on 
the government’s need for the data and the specific oversight procedures 
intended to monitor the use of the records.232  Yet he strongly stated that the 
FISC no longer has confidence that the government is “doing its utmost to 
ensure” that the court’s instructions are fully complied with.233  As a result, 
he signed the order based on the FISC’s prior determinations that the 
metadata collection program complies with 50 U.S.C. § 1861, but stated 
that “more is needed to protect the privacy of U.S. person information.”234 
2.  Textual Analysis of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 
The scope of relevance has been debated in the current litigation.  As 
Judge Eagan and other supporters of the metadata collection program see it, 
“relevant” should be read broadly.  Opponents of the program, on the other 
hand, feel that the term should be given its plain meaning, which they 
define as “actually related” to the investigation. 
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a.  The Government’s Argument:  The Purpose Indicates That the Statute 
Should Be Understood Broadly 
The NSA reads “relevant” broadly to encompass situations such as this.  
The NSA refers to general definitions to support this conclusion, such as 
“anything ‘[b]earing upon, connected with, [or] pertinent to’ a specified 
subject matter.”235  In enacting the statute, Congress understood that 
relevance has special meaning within the law, and the government states 
that a document is “relevant” not just when it directly bears on the matter, 
but also where “it is reasonable to believe that it could lead to other 
information that directly bears on that subject matter.”236 
Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, as is arguably the case 
here given the debate surrounding the term, courts next look to its 
purpose.237  The government contends that the data is relevant because 
there is reason to believe that conducting a broad search will produce 
counterterrorism information that fulfills the goal of the program in the first 
place.238  As the government states, “Unless the data is aggregated, it may 
not be feasible to identify chains of communications,” and the objectives 
advanced by the metadata collection program would not be successful if the 
NSA was limited in the amount of records it could obtain.239 
b.  The Opposition’s Argument:  The Plain Meaning of the Statute 
Invalidates the Program 
Critics of the program point to the presumptively relevant definition240 
from section 215.241  This includes records relating to an agent of a foreign 
power and individuals in contact with a suspected agent of a foreign 
power.242  It is common sense that nearly all of the records obtained from 
Verizon and other phone service providers will not meet these criteria.  
They therefore believe that the FBI bears the burden of showing why those 
records are in fact relevant and should be included in the orders.243 
Opponents further argue that “‘everything’ nullifies the relevance 
limitation in the statute.”244  Essentially, they contend that if law 
enforcement always has access to all records, they can inevitably identify a 
subset of records as “relevant”—yet that renders the term “relevant” 
essentially meaningless.245  In construing a statute, courts are supposed to 
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give meaning to every word that Congress used,246 but by defining bulk 
collection as relevant, they would in effect be ignoring that term. 
Furthermore, the government has acknowledged that the vast majority of 
the data collected under the orders is not relevant to any investigation.247  
Allowing the NSA to determine what is relevant once the data is in their 
possession violates the plain meaning of the statute.248  In essence, critics 
contend that the NSA is applying the prerequisite for collecting records 
retroactively.  The statute requires that there be grounds to believe the data 
is relevant prior to collection, but that determination cannot be made until 
the records are actually in the NSA’s possession and undergoing 
analysis.249  It is not logical, according to EPIC’s supporters, to believe that 
there are reasonable grounds that all, or even most, of the records collected 
will be relevant, which is in direct conflict with the statute’s requirement 
that there be reason to believe the collected items are relevant.250 
Even if the purpose of the statute is analyzed, critics point out that the 
program must comply with the guidelines set forth in Executive Order 
12,333.251  One such guideline is that the “[a]gencies within the Intelligence 
Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible.”252  
Thus regardless of the NSA’s stated purpose, the program is not the least 
intrusive means, as it affects all Americans.253 
3.  Comparing the Business Records Provision to Other Sources of Law 
It is worth discussing other sources that define relevance, because the 
term is left undefined in section 215.  No one source is directly on point, but 
taken collectively, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rules of civil 
discovery, similar cases, and other statutes may help courts determine the 
best reading of “relevant.” 
a.  Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Discovery 
Comparisons have been drawn to the Federal Rules of Evidence’s 
standard for relevance.254  Rule 401 states that evidence is relevant if “it has 
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without 
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the evidence.”255  Under this analogy, information would be relevant if it 
has some bearing on investigations into terrorist organizations. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence require that evidence must be material 
and have probative value to be considered relevant.256  Materiality 
considers the fit between the evidence and the case, while probative value 
refers to the tendency of the evidence to establish the proposition that it is 
offered to prove.257  Importantly, one item of evidence does not need to 
prove the proposition on its own; the evidence is taken en masse.258  
Regarding the metadata collection program, it is not entirely clear how the 
records fit this standard because the majority of the records individually fail 
to meet the standard of probative value, but might meet it when considered 
collectively. 
The government also compares “relevant” to its use in civil discovery.259  
The Supreme Court has construed it to “broadly. . . encompass any matter 
that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear 
on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”260  Thus they argue that courts 
have permitted bulk collection to satisfy a relevance standard. 
b.  Other Cases 
Cases from other contexts may also prove helpful in defining relevance 
within section 215, but again, there are conflicting interpretations and 
applications. 
i.  Government Support 
The government points to a number of cases where courts have found a 
relevance standard satisfied when a large volume of information is collected 
in order to identify a few pieces of pertinent information that directly 
impacted the investigation.261  For example, in In re Subpoena Duces 
Tecum,262 the Fourth Circuit held that all of a doctor’s files could be 
relevant in an investigation of federal healthcare offenses, despite the fact 
that not all of them were evidence of the offenses with which he was 
charged.263  Additionally, in Carrillo Huettel, LLP v. SEC,264 the Southern 
District of California held that although not all of the records requested 
were relevant, they would likely contain enough relevant information for 
the subpoena to be considered valid.265 
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David Kris, former Assistant Attorney General for National Security, 
points to In re Grand Jury Proceedings:  Subpoena Duces Tecum266 as the 
most analogous case.267  There, the government sought records about drug 
dealers in Kansas City, and in order to locate them, subpoenaed 
substantially all of Western Union’s records, including those of “hundreds 
of innocent people.”268  The Eighth Circuit, however, approved the 
subpoena but left open the possibility that on remand the subpoena could be 
narrowed.269 
ii.  Privacy Advocates’ Support 
On the other side of the debate, critics point to cases where courts have 
found that bulk data collection does not amount to relevance in searches for 
a few key pieces of information.270  For example, in In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 15, 1993,271 the Southern District of 
New York held that a subpoena failed the relevancy standard because the 
data sought contained too much irrelevant information along with the 
pertinent data.272  The court explained that because the subpoena demanded 
irrelevant documents, it was unreasonably broad.273 
Additionally, in the civil discovery context, the Supreme Court has stated 
that a subpoena for “all documents” was “anything but appropriate” because 
it was too broad in what it sought.274  Again, none of the cases cited in the 
context of the metadata collection program squarely address the issue 
presented here and most are tangentially related at best.  The courts will 
therefore be tasked with defining relevance with little guidance from prior 
decisions. 
c.  The Stored Communications Act Provides  
a Point of Statutory Comparison 
Section 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act establishes 
procedures for the government to obtain information from electronic 
communications service providers.275  While not directly related to FISA 
because it is not related to preventing international terrorism, the language 
of the statute is very similar to that of section 215.  In order to obtain 
noncontent records (i.e., records pertaining to the subscriber or customer 
that do not include the content of the communication), the government must 
offer “specific and articulable facts” demonstrating that there are 
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“reasonable grounds to believe that [the records sought] are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”276  This is slightly different 
from section 215, as section 2703(d) requires specific and articulable facts, 
while section 215 only requires “reasonable grounds.”277  Arguably, section 
215 amounts to a lower standard, especially since the specific and 
articulable facts language existed prior to September 11.278  Section 
2703(d) also refers to criminal investigations, whereas section 215 is for 
foreign intelligence purposes.  As such, it seems, according to the 
government, that Congress provided “more latitude at the production 
stage,” but balanced it with “post-production checks” that are not present in 
the Stored Communications Act.279 
4.  Legislative History from the Reauthorizations of Section 215 
Over time, FISA has been amended to broaden the scope of the type of 
things the government can access—as a tradeoff, however, it has become 
arguably more restrictive in how those things might be accessed.280  
Previously, FISA required the FBI to present “specific and articulable 
facts,” rather than just a showing of relevance.281  The word “relevancy” 
was added to section 215 during the 2005 and 2006 reauthorizations.282 
Critics of the program point to legislative history accompanying the 
amended statute in 2006, which indicates that the relevancy requirement 
was added in order to limit the information available under section 215.  
For example, Senator Wyden discussed his fears that the statute would be 
used to fight terrorism at the expense of civil liberties, but that ultimately 
the power to go on “fishing expeditions” was not included in the version to 
be passed.283  Senator Feinstein noted that section 215 was changed to 
“tighten[] the requirement to make it clear that investigators must not only 
show relevance but also that the request pertains to a known or suspected 
agent of a foreign power or their associates.”284  Putting the standard in 
context, Senator Kyl indicated that “[r]elevance is a simple and well 
established standard of law,” and that its use in section 215 was meant to be 
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understood in the same manner as other areas of law like subpoenas and 
civil discovery.285 
The government points to the fact that the legislature has repeatedly 
reenacted the statute without change.286  The problem with this is that the 
majority of the information needed to make an informed decision about the 
metadata collection program was, and in many cases remains, classified.  
However, information was provided to members of both houses through 
their respective Intelligence Committees prior to both the 2009 and 2011 
reauthorizations.  For example, prior to the May 2011 reenactment, the 
Office of the Assistant Attorney General provided notice to the chairmen of 
the Intelligence Committee of each house to share certain information with 
their members.287  The report highlighted the key points of the program, 
including the fact that it “collect[s] a large amount of information,” and that 
the orders require the production of “substantially all of the telephone calls” 
handled by a service provider.288  It also mentions that there is a system of 
checks and balances in place, but that there have been compliance issues 
despite those safeguards.289 
According to certain members of Congress, though, they did not intend 
for unbounded freedom in determining what is relevant.290  They assert that 
under their understanding of the statute, the metadata collection program 
goes beyond their definition of relevant and that relevant was meant to be a 
limitation, not a broad standard.291  Moreover, they required that it be 
relevant to an authorized investigation, rather than general efforts to combat 
terrorism.292  Congressman Sensenbrenner, writing for at least some of his 
colleagues, argues that they understood “relevant” to be a limiting factor, 
and that they did not intend for it to allow the kind of dragnet collection that 
the NSA is currently conducting.293 
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5.  Executive and Legislative Responses:   
Embrace the Program or Rein It In? 
The metadata collection program has proven to be extremely divisive, 
and the recent attention given to NSA surveillance has caused politicians to 
weigh in on the debate.  The remainder of this section provides an overview 
of public officials’ statements concerning the program, competing bills in 
Congress addressing mass data collection, and the recommendations of a 
presidential task force assembled to deal with the issue. 
a.  Conflicting Public Statements 
The Obama Administration generally still supports the program, as 
evidenced by statements made by Robert Litt, General Counsel at the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, over the summer of 2013.294  In his 
address, he characterized Snowden’s leaks as “reckless” and emphasized 
the legality of the program.295  He outlined the rationale behind the 
conclusion that the program is legal, taking care to note that it is not just 
“the Intelligence Community alone” that believes bulk collection is 
authorized under section 215, but also FISC judges and Congress.296 
On the other side of the debate, Congressman Sensenbrenner, author of 
the Patriot Act and a member of Congress during all of the Patriot Act’s 
reauthorizations, offered an intriguing opinion.  He noted that the metadata 
collection program is not being used in the manner that section 215 was 
intended.297  In his view, mass data collection exceeds the scope of the 
statute’s design.298  By necessity, bulk collection brings in millions of 
unrelated records, but that goes “beyond any reasonable understanding of 
[relevant].”299 
As discussed, Sensenbrenner indicated that he was unaware of how the 
metadata collection program operated at the time that he reauthorized it, but 
members of Congress were provided with information outlining the basics 
of the program.300  Senate Majority Leader Reid indicated that it is illogical 
for Senators (and presumably Congressmen) to say that they were unaware 
of what was occurring.301  As he points out, there were “many” classified 
 
 294. Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Privacy, 




 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. See generally Sensenbrenner Brief, supra note 290 (arguing that Congress did not 
authorize the type of data collection the NSA is currently undertaking). 
 298. See generally id. 
 299. See id. at 5–6. 
 300. See supra notes 286–89 and accompanying text. 
 301. Michael McAuliff & Sabrina Siddiqui, Harry Reid:  If Lawmakers Didn’t Know 
About NSA Surveillance, It’s Their Own Fault, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2013, 4:04 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/11/harry-reid-nsa_n_3423393.html. 
2014] THE RELEVANCE OF RELEVANCE 2433 
and unclassified meetings, and if an individual did not avail himself of the 
opportunity to attend, he should not be able to complain that he was ill 
informed after the fact.302 
b.  Congressional Response:  Competing Bills To Define the Scope of 
Governmental Authority Under § 1861 
Over the summer of 2013, a one-sentence bill was introduced and 
narrowly failed to pass the House of Representatives.303  The bill would 
have required all 50 U.S.C. § 1861 orders funded by FISA provisions to 
include the sentence, “This Order limits the collection of any tangible 
things . . . to those tangible things that pertain to a person who is the subject 
of an investigation described in section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. § 1861).”304  This blanket prohibition 
ultimately failed, but indicates the growing concern over the metadata 
collection program. 
More recently, there was a renewed attempt to revise FISA.  Some 
members of Congress have indicated a willingness to curb the power of the 
NSA regarding domestic surveillance through the introduction of the USA 
FREEDOM Act (Freedom Act).305  The bill is being co-authored by 
Congressman Sensenbrenner, and would end “dragnet collection of phone 
records under Section 215” by requiring that the records obtained are 
“relevant and material to an investigation,” a more exacting standard than 
the one currently enforced by FISA.306  Additionally, the bill seeks to add a 
more exacting judicial review process and enhanced accountability and 
transparency.307  The main goal of the bill is to tighten the rules 
surrounding the collection of metadata by requiring that the items collected 
pertain to “a foreign power or agent of one; the activities of a target who is 
a suspected agent of a foreign power; a person in contact with a known or 
suspected agent of a foreign power,” which, in effect, eliminates the 
viability of the metadata collection program.308 
While some of Congress is looking to rein in the power of FISA, others 
are criticizing those efforts.  Patrick Kelley, acting general counsel of the 
FBI, stated that the logic behind the Freedom Act is flawed because it 
presumes that the NSA knows exactly who they are after, which is not 
true.309  He posits that bulk collection is necessary.  In that same vein, 
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Senator Feinstein, chairperson of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, along with Ranking Member Chambliss have introduced their 
own bill in opposition to the view that the Freedom Act authors take.310  
The FISA Improvements Act would affirm the legality of the metadata 
collection program, but would codify restrictions on when and how the data 
can be accessed and used.311  It would impose a strict retention period of 
five years for any data collected under section 215, and would require 
approval by the attorney general for querying any data older than three 
years.312  The bill would also codify certain issues that were previously 
addressed in FISC orders, including the limit on hops and the number of 
people who can access the collected metadata.313  Finally, the bill would 
require the NSA to submit its findings of RAS for U.S. persons to the FISC 
for judicial review, and denial of the request would result in destruction of 
that collection.314  The bill largely keeps the metadata collection program 
intact, while providing for some additional oversight and explicitly 
codifying the practices that are already ongoing. 
c.  The Executive Branch Response 
While members of Congress immediately began a dialogue about the 
program, the executive branch was slower to take action.  President Obama 
assembled a task force in August 2013 to brainstorm potential changes to 
mass data collection, and then in January 2014, gave a public address 
outlining his decision based on the recommendations of that task force. 
i.  The Presidential Task Force Recommends Changes 
In August 2013, President Obama established a task force, the Review 
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology, to assess the NSA 
metadata collection program and propose changes.315  The group ultimately 
proposed more than forty changes to the NSA’s current surveillance 
tactics.316  In their final report, the panel recommended that the data be 
maintained by the service providers, rather than collected by the NSA, and 
that the government only have access to a specific individual’s data 
pursuant to a court order.317  The report also recommended changes to the 
FISC appointment process, suggesting that the power be distributed among 
all nine Supreme Court justices, rather than remaining solely in the hands of 
the chief justice.318  The report ultimately does not call for a complete 
shutdown of the program, but did state that the current system “creates 
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potential risks to public trust, personal privacy, and civil liberty.”319  The 
group’s recommendations are not binding, but President Obama has 
indicated that he is open to the suggestions provided.320 
ii.  President Obama Begins the Process of Change 
In a January 2014 speech, President Obama outlined a number of 
changes to be implemented to the metadata collection program, among 
other NSA surveillance programs.321  The address called for FISC approval 
before data can be examined by analysts, except in cases of emergency.322  
Additionally, the President limited any analysis to two hops, rather than the 
current three.323  As far as where and how the records will be stored and 
whether the FISC will be restructured, the President left those decisions in 
the hands of Congress.324 
C.  Fourth Amendment:  Are These Unreasonable Searches? 
While the Fourth Amendment concerns raised by the metadata collection 
program are important, this Note only discusses them briefly.  If the courts 
decide that the metadata collection program comports with FISA, they will 
then be tasked with deciding the question of whether the orders are 
constitutional.  The essential inquiry in that analysis is whether Smith v. 
Maryland and the third-party doctrine control the type of data collection 
that the NSA is currently conducting.  It is important to note, however, that 
even if the activity amounts to a search under the Fourth Amendment, it 
may still be “reasonable” based on the strong governmental interests at 
stake.325  Part II.C.1 examines the government’s argument and Judge 
Pauley’s decision that Smith controls.  Part II.C.2 discusses the various 
arguments advanced by privacy groups, and the opinion from Klayman v. 
Obama in which Judge Leon found that Smith does not control this 
particular issue. 
1.  Smith v. Maryland Directly Controls This Issue 
The NSA contends that Smith controls a Fourth Amendment analysis of 
the metadata collection program.  Judge Pauley supported this conclusion in 
ACLU v. Clapper. 
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a.  The Government’s Argument 
The NSA argues that because the data collected by the program has all 
been voluntarily turned over to a third party, the subscribers have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it and there is no Fourth Amendment 
violation.326  The government takes this position even while acknowledging 
that the information collected here is more extensive than the simple pen 
register at issue in Smith.327 
The government bolsters its argument by pointing out that the Court 
affirmed its holding in Smith in subsequent cases, and lower courts have 
found that the holding in Smith goes beyond the narrow limitations of a 
classic pen register.328  Under Supreme Court precedent, the reasoning in 
Smith applies “even if there is an understanding that the third party will 
treat the information as confidential.”329  For example, in SEC v. Jerry T. 
O’Brien, Inc.,330 the Court stated that “when a person communicates 
information to a third party even on the understanding that the 
communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party conveys 
that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities.”331  
Additionally, in United States v. Reed,332 the Ninth Circuit found that 
collecting call origination, length, and time information was nothing more 
than a pen register and trap-and-trace device, leaving the target with no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.333  The government argues that United 
States v. Jones is easily distinguished from the issue here because it does 
not involve a physical trespass similar to the GPS in Jones and thus does 
not affect the current third-party doctrine.334 
b. The Judicial Support:  ACLU v. Clapper 
In assessing the legality of the metadata collection program, Judge 
Pauley accepted the government’s position that Smith controls.  First, he 
accepted the premise that information voluntarily conveyed to a third party 
is no longer afforded the same level of privacy.335  Moreover, he stated that 
“[t]he ACLU’s reliance on the concurring opinions in Jones is misplaced” 
because the Court did not overrule Smith, and it is improper for lower 
courts to speculate on whether precedent will be overruled.336  Therefore, at 
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least for now, lower courts are bound by Smith and do not have the freedom 
to ignore the third-party doctrine.337 
2.  Smith v. Maryland Is Distinguishable 
Part II.C.2.a provides an overview of the privacy advocates’ argument 
that Smith is distinguishable from the metadata collection program and 
therefore does not control a Fourth Amendment analysis.  Judge Leon 
supported this outcome in his opinion in Klayman v. Obama, which is 
outlined in Part II.C.2.b. 
a.  The Privacy Advocates’ Argument 
Privacy advocates assert that the metadata collection program violates the 
Fourth Amendment on several grounds.  First, privacy advocates argue that 
because the orders compel phone companies to turn over all records on a 
daily basis, they are general warrants, which are banned by the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement.338 
Privacy advocates further argue that Smith v. Maryland is distinguishable 
from the current facts and was wrongly decided.339  Smith involved a single 
suspect, whereas the metadata collection program involves mass 
surveillance that can reveal more about an individual’s habits and personal 
life than a simple pen register that only records what numbers are being 
called.340  Moreover, the data collected here involves routing information, 
which includes data about the cell sites involved and the path of the call.341  
This type of data goes beyond what was collected in Smith, because it 
allows the NSA to track an individual’s location to some degree.342 
Privacy advocates suggest that even if Smith controls, the Court should 
reconsider the third-party doctrine in order to adapt to modern 
technology.343  Advocates maintain the public is aware that records are 
turned over to their service providers, but there is no reason to assume those 
records are available beyond that closed universe.344  In Jones, members of 
the Court suggested that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that 
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” because we live in a “digital age” 
where people are constantly revealing information about themselves to third 
parties.345  Echoing Justice Marshall’s dissent in Smith, it has become 
impossible for people to conduct their ordinary business without exposing 
 
 337. See id. 
 338. Cato Brief, supra note 15, at 10–11. 
 339. Id. at 14. 
 340. Id. at 18–19. 
 341. EPIC Petition, supra note 5, at 26–27. 
 342. See id. at 28. 
 343. Cato Brief, supra note 15, at 19. 
 344. Id. at 20. 
 345. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see 
also supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
2438 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
themselves to the risk of surveillance.346  These groups assert that the time 
for reconsideration has come and the metadata collection program provides 
the ideal platform to do so.347 
b.  The Judicial Support:  Klayman v. Obama 
In Klayman v. Obama, Judge Leon was the first non-FISC judge to 
evaluate the metadata collection program and was presented with arguments 
concerning both section 215 and the Fourth Amendment.348  Judge Leon 
chose to grant the injunction on Fourth Amendment grounds.  This became 
a controversial point, as some scholars feel that the metadata collection 
program rests on solid constitutional grounds given the Smith third-party 
doctrine, and that the real gray area is whether the program exceeds its 
statutory authority.349  There is speculation that on appeal, “the 
constitutional issue will disappear from the case altogether.”350  Judge 
Leon, however, stated that the issue before the Court in Smith was “a far cry 
from the issue in this case,” and that because Smith is such an old decision 
with respect to technological advances, it cannot be considered precedent 
for this issue.351  Judge Leon emphasized that while the data itself might not 
be drastically different from that at issue in Smith, the relationship people 
now have with their phones, as opposed to thirty-four years ago when Smith 
was decided, significantly alters the legal landscape.352  Judge Leon 
concluded that the plaintiffs had shown a significant likelihood that they 
would succeed on the merits of their claim, a requirement to obtain a 
preliminary injunction because the metadata collection program does not 
meet the standard for “special needs,” another exception to the warrant 
requirement.353  While his constitutional analysis raises interesting 
questions, the real issue on appeal will likely center on the statutory 
authority for the program. 
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III.  DEFINING RELEVANCE:  PROPOSING A RETURN TO A MORE 
RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF SEARCHES AND KEEPING  
PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE 
Taking all of the arguments into account and considering the national 
security concerns, the ideal solution is a middle ground between the two 
sides where the NSA is not completely prevented from collecting data, but 
also has more limits on its authority and greater oversight to ensure the 
proper use of the records it does obtain.  Part III.A argues that under current 
precedent, the metadata program is permissible, but in spite of this, the 
Court or Congress should step in to limit the NSA’s power to collect bulk 
data.  Part III.B outlines a potential framework for establishing a 
compromise between the two sides. 
A.  The Metadata Collection Program Is Legal  
but Should Be Limited in Scope 
Ultimately, it appears that the metadata collection program is authorized 
based on current interpretations of the law.  Smith v. Maryland provides the 
Fourth Amendment basis for obtaining the records, and although the Court 
has indicated that advances in technology might necessitate reevaluation, 
they have yet to do so.354  The rationale for the metadata collection program 
currently rests largely on the fact that it has been approved by fifteen 
different FISC judges,355 and outside of a common sense definition of 
“relevant,” there is no overwhelming evidence that the statute has been 
wrongly interpreted.  There is nothing to prevent the Court, however, from 
shifting back to a more restrictive view of searches.  Technology is 
developing faster than ever before and, as a whole, Americans are more 
reliant on it than in previous decades.  As such, the law needs to account for 
the inability of people to deny information to their third-party service 
providers and reevaluate the breadth of what is currently authorized by 
FISA.356 
This goal can be achieved through either reform or elimination.  Reform 
would entail providing for more stringent oversight or stricter criteria for 
what types of records can be collected and under what circumstances it can 
be compiled.  Elimination, on the other hand, would involve a general 
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prohibition on mass data collection entirely.357  The current response seems 
to favor reform, and while it might be achieved by any of the three 
branches, it appears that any significant change is going to be the result of a 
collective effort.  The current litigation gives the courts the appropriate 
platform for reining in bulk data collection, and the executive and 
legislative branches have taken initial steps in working towards long-term 
solutions.358 
B.  The Program Should Continue on a Smaller and More Defined Scale 
The metadata collection program demonstrates the conflict between the 
need for secrecy and the value of transparency.359  Clearly, for public 
safety, the government must be able to keep certain information classified, 
but at the same time, in order to maintain a free society, the public should 
be privy to certain information about government surveillance.  Because the 
goals of ensuring national security and protecting the American public are 
worthy and important, the ideal choice—though intensive and likely a very 
lengthy process—would be an overhaul of the existing FISA structure. 
1.  Evaluating the Steps Already Taken 
Short of changing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (although some 
members of the Court have hinted that it may be time to do so), reform of 
FISA, rather than elimination, is the ideal solution.  President Obama has 
taken the initial steps towards change,360 but his solutions fall short of a 
long-term fix.  For some of the more difficult and intricate decisions, the 
President has called on Congress to help.  This, however, is problematic 
given the current divide on the issue as evidenced by the competing bills.361  
The Freedom Act goes too far in the opposite direction from the current 
state of electronic surveillance because it would essentially shut down the 
metadata collection program.362  The data is meant to be useful in finding 
connections and working towards the goal of preventing terrorism, and 
without that information, national security is in jeopardy.363  Patrick Kelley, 
acting general counsel of the FBI, indicated that the approach advocated in 
the Freedom Act is flawed because it presumes that there are specific 
targets, but it is not always entirely clear who intelligence officers are 
looking for until they have started analyzing the data.364  The FISA 
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Improvements Act, on the other hand, does not go far enough, as it 
primarily serves to codify the existing structure, which President Obama 
has decided against.365 
2.  Where Do We Go From Here?  Scaling Back the Program 
The success of the metadata collection program is controversial and it is 
not entirely clear how effective it has been in preventing terrorism.  Some 
reports state that the NSA cannot point to any significant number of plots 
prevented by the program or any other objective measure of success.366  
Others, however, suggest that the program has been considerably beneficial.  
For example, Judge Pauley pointed to three separate times in 2009 where 
metadata was queried in connection with terrorist plots that were ultimately 
foiled.367  These three instances, even standing alone, merit the continuance 
of the metadata collection program in some form.  Preventing just one act 
of terrorism indicates success, but the bigger question is how much 
individual privacy the American public should have to sacrifice to achieve 
that success.  At this time, there is not enough reported value in the program 
to warrant its continuance on its current scale. 
Even accepting that the program may have prevented a number of 
terrorist plots, the NSA has not explained why less obtrusive measures 
would be inadequate to achieve the goal of preventing terrorist activities.  
Because the data can only be queried if it is one of the identified, RAS-
approved numbers,368 there is no reason why the NSA could not request 
those records specifically in the order.  Arguably, this is a more 
cumbersome process, as any numbers that are in contact with the identifier 
would then also need to be requested and so on until the third hop (or 
second after President Obama’s changes are implemented)369 was 
completed. 
Since it would be burdensome and inefficient to collect the records this 
way, the best alternative seems to be limiting the scope of what FISC orders 
may request, which would, in essence, eliminate bulk data collection with 
few exceptions.  With the level of technology available, it would certainly 
be feasible to obtain a group of records for numbers in contact with 
identified terrorist numbers.  Essentially, this approach could allow the 
NSA to obtain the data for the three hops that its analysts are currently 
permitted to query without obtaining data beyond that.  This would not act 
as a blanket prohibition on metadata collection and would even permit large 
amounts of records to be obtained simultaneously, but would afford the 
general population a greater level of privacy protection than the current 
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system permits.  Service providers would be responsible for keeping the 
data, as they already are, and would only provide the necessary information 
to government officials.370  Also, this approach would not require the court 
order that President Obama has implemented.  While court approval sounds 
good in theory, the FISC has proven that it is inclined to rubber-stamp 
anything the NSA requests.  The proceedings would also still be secretive 
and one-sided, therefore resulting in no added protection to the current 
system, while slowing the process down. 
The costs of the current FISA structure have proven to far outweigh its 
benefits.  Although the right to be free from searches and seizures is not 
absolute, the metadata collection program in its current form constitutes an 
unreasonable level of intrusion.  The NSA points out that there are stringent 
oversight procedures371 in place, but even with those, there have been 
significant compliance breaches372 that seem unlikely to be fixed if the 
statute remains in its current form.  By creating more transparency—even if 
that means just providing more detailed information to Congress—and 
limiting the number and types of records that can be obtained with one 
order, the objectives of the metadata program could be fulfilled while 
sacrificing less privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Public opinion is changing and, as such, the law needs to be modified to 
account for those perceptions.  Because technology is constantly evolving 
and plays such a significant role in our daily lives, the law needs to adapt to 
this shift and take a more expansive view of the expectation of privacy.  It 
seems fairly clear that current Fourth Amendment precedent permits this 
type of surveillance, but the Court has indicated a willingness to potentially 
reconsider this structure. 
Combined with the ambiguity of the terminology in 50 U.S.C. § 1861 
and the far-reaching effects of the metadata collection program, it seems 
now is the perfect time to do just that.  The term “relevant” cannot 
reasonably be understood to encompass the phone records of all Americans, 
but the national security interests that the program seeks to protect are still 
extremely important.  Rather than discontinuing the program entirely, 
limitations need to be imposed that clearly delineate when and how records 
can be collected and data may be used. 
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